

Proof (Lemma). Need to show:

$$(N) \Rightarrow (N|N) \Rightarrow (N|N) \Rightarrow (N).$$

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$$\begin{aligned} P_2[N=m] &= P_2[N=m | C=c] \\ &= \frac{P_2[N=m \wedge C=c]}{P_2[C=c]} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Rightarrow P_2[N=m \wedge C=c] = P_2[N=m] \cdot P_2[C=c]$$

$$\Rightarrow I(N; C) = 0 \quad \checkmark$$

$(ND) \Rightarrow (ND\Delta)$ For m from M and c from C :

$$Pr [Enc(K, m) = c] =$$

$$Pr [\underbrace{Enc(K, M) = c}_{C} \mid M = m] =$$

$$Pr [C = c \mid M = m]$$

$$= Pr [C = c]$$

Replacing m with m' :

$$\Pr[E_{mc}(K, m') = c] = \Pr[C = c] \quad \checkmark$$

$(N \wedge N) \Rightarrow (N)$. Take any c from $\mathcal{C}$:

$$\Pr[C = c] = \Pr[C = c \mid N = m]$$

I claim this!  by $(N \vee N)$

If claim true, then:

$$\Pr[N = m \mid C = c] \cdot \Pr[C = c] =$$

$$= \Pr[M=m \wedge C=c] =$$

$$\Pr[C=c | M=m] \cdot \Pr[M=m],$$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr[M=m] = \frac{\Pr[M=m | C=c] \cdot \cancel{\Pr[C=c]}}{\Pr[C=c | M=m]}$$

It remains to prove the claim. ✓

$$\Pr[C=c] = \sum_{m'} \Pr[C=c \wedge M=m']$$

$$= \sum_{m'} P_2 [C=c | H=m'] \cdot P_2 [H=m']$$

$$= \sum_{m'} P_2 [E_{mc}(K, H)=c | H=m'] \cdot P_2 [H=m']$$

$$= \sum_{m'} P_2 [E_{mc}(K, m')=c] \cdot P_2 [H=m']$$

$$= \sum_{m'} P_2 [E_{mc}(K, m)=c] \cdot P_2 [H=m']$$

$$= P_2 [E_{mc}(K, m)=c] \cdot \underbrace{\sum_{m'} P_2 [H=m']}_{=1}$$


$$= P_2 [E_{mc}(K, m) = c]$$

$$= P_2 [\underbrace{E_{mc}(K, M) = c}_{C} \mid M = m]$$

$$= P_2 [C = c \mid M = m] \quad \square$$

MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES

Also called MACs.



CORRECTNESS: By definition of Tag
→ DETERMINISTIC.

UNFORGEABILITY: Should be hard to
forge valid tag τ' on msg m' .
Not only that! Hard to produce it
even given a valid pair (m, τ) as
long as $m' \neq m$.

DEF (STATISTICAL SECURE MAC). We
say $\Pi = \text{Tag}$ has ϵ -statistical

security (unforgeability) if $\forall m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$
with $m' \neq m$, $\forall z, z' \in \mathcal{Z}$:

$$\Pr_K [\text{Tag}(K, m') = z' \mid \text{Tag}(K, m) = z] \leq \epsilon$$

($t = 1$)

Here ϵ is a parameter, e.g. $\epsilon = 2^{-80}$.

EXERCISE. Impossible to get $\epsilon = 0$.

Because a random $z' \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}$ has

probability $\geq 1/\epsilon$ to be correct.

Note that the def is ONE-TIME!

We will show:

— The notion is ACHIEVABLE

— It's inefficient. In fact:

THEM Any t -Time 2^{-t} -stat. secure

Tag has a key of size $(t-1) \cdot \lambda$.

We now show that any family of
HASH FUNCTION with a particular

properly satisfies the definition.

DEF (PAIRWISE INDEPENDENCE) - A

family $\mathcal{H} = \{h_K : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Z}\}_{K \in \mathcal{K}}$

is PAIRWISE INDEP. if: $\forall m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$
s.t. $m \neq m'$ then:

$$(h(K, m), h(K, m'))$$

is UNIFORM over $\mathcal{Z}^2 = \mathcal{Z} \times \mathcal{Z}$ for
 K UNIFORM in $\mathcal{K}$.