

$$\rightarrow h_{a,b}(x) = ax + b \pmod{p}$$

$(a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ is pairwise indep.

EXERCISE

Prove or disprove: The one-time pad is a statistical secure MAC. This means:

$$\text{Tag}(k, m) = k \oplus m = z$$

$$\text{Attack: } z' = z \oplus m''; \quad m' = m \oplus m''$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 c' &= (k \oplus m) \oplus m'' \approx k \oplus (m \oplus m'') \\
 &= k \oplus m'
 \end{aligned}$$

The pair m', c' is VALID.

EXERCISE

Show there exists Tag that is not secure but not PERFECT SECRET.

TIP Let H_U be PAIRWISE INDEPENDENT,
 Then $\text{Tag}(k, m) = h_k(m)$ is

ϵ -stat. secure for $\epsilon = 1/|\mathcal{Z}|$

Proof. On the one hand: $\forall m, \forall z$

$$\Pr_K [\text{Tag}(K, m) = z] = \Pr_K [h(K, m) = z] \\ = 1/|\mathcal{Z}|$$

On the other hand, $\forall m, m', \forall z, z',$
 $m \neq m'$

$$\Pr_K [\text{Tag}(K, m) = z \wedge \text{Tag}(K, m') = z'] \\ = 1/|\mathcal{Z}|^2$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{Pr } [h(K, m') = z' \mid h(K, m) = z]$$

$$= \frac{1/|C|^2}{1/|C|} = \frac{1}{|C|} \quad \square$$

Construction: Let p be a prime. Define:

$$z = h_{a,b}(x) = ax + b \pmod{p}$$

$\rightarrow \{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$

$$x, z \in \mathbb{Z}_p \quad (a, b) \in \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_p$$

LEMMA The above H is pairwise indep.

So, we get $\epsilon = 1/p$ - stat. secure MAC -
proof. For $m, m' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $z, z' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$
 $m \neq m'$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{a,b} [h_{a,b}(m) = z \wedge h_{a,b}(m') = z'] \\ &= \Pr_{a,b} \left[\begin{pmatrix} m & 1 \\ m' & 1 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} a \\ b \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} z \\ z' \end{pmatrix} \pmod{p} \right] \end{aligned}$$

$$= P_{z, e, b} \begin{bmatrix} e \\ b \end{bmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} m & 1 \\ m' & 1 \end{pmatrix}^{-1} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} z \\ z' \end{pmatrix} \text{ mod } p$$

$$= P_{z, e, b} \begin{bmatrix} e \\ b \end{bmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} c \\ d \end{pmatrix} = 1/p^e$$

c, d are fixed
function of m, m'
 z, z'

We have a z^{-d} -stat. secure MAC
by choosing any 1-bit prime p .

Drawback: The key is twice as long as the message. Unfortunately:

THM Any t -Time $2^{-\lambda}$ -stat. secure MAC has keys of size $(t+1) \cdot \lambda$.

We'd like to do much better: Alice and Bob share a key of length λ independent of t .

RANDOMNESS EXTRACTION

Randomness is crucial for crypto. For one, we need random keys.

But also, we'll see that even the algorithms need to be randomized.

Randomness comes from nature. Randomness in nature is IMPERFECT, while it can be "purified" it's very expensive.

Randomness extraction: How to extract UNIFORM randomness from an IMPERFECT RANDOM source.

Example: The goal is to design some function Ext that takes some X (not UNIFORM) and outputs something UNIFORM.

Suppose you have a biased coin: $\Pr[B=0] = p < 1/2$. How to extract UNIFORM randomness?

- Sample $b_1, b_2 \leftarrow B$

- If $b_1 = b_2$
sample again

Else

Output 1 if $b_1 = 0, b_2 = 1$

Output 0 if $b_1 = 1, b_2 = 0$

$$\Pr[\text{Ext outputs } 0] = \Pr[\text{Ext outputs } 1] \\ = p(1-p).$$

$\Pr[\text{No output after } k \text{ trials}]$ is small.

In general, can we design a "good" Ext for any X ? No. Because Ext is obtained by mixing and X could be completely predictable.

$\Rightarrow X$ needs to be UNPREDICTABLE.

DEF (MIN-ENTROPY). The min-entropy of X is $H_{\infty}(X) = -\log \max_x \Pr[X = x]$.


Intuition: The best probability to predict X by UNBOUNDED ADV.

Example: Let $X \equiv U_n$ (UNIFORM over $\{0, 1\}^n$)

$$H_\infty(U_n) = n$$

Let $X = 0^n$ (constant)

$$H_\infty(X) = 0$$




For real-world $\text{P} \neq \text{NP}$, we can get get
lower bound $H_{\infty}(X) \geq k$. ($k < n$)

Goal: Design Ext that extracts from
any X s.t. $H_{\infty}(X) \geq k$.

Thm. This is impossible even if $k = n - 1$
and $\text{Ext}: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$

Proof. Intuition: For every $\text{Ext}: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$
there exists some X s.t. $H_{\infty}(X) = n - 1$
but Ext fails on such X .

Let $b \in \{0,1\}$ be the value that maximizes
 $|\text{Ext}^{-1}(b)|$.



\Rightarrow

$$|\text{Ext}^{-1}(b)| \geq 2^{m-1}$$

let x be uniform

or $\text{Ext}^{-1}(b)$

Now:

$$|t_\infty(x)| \geq m-1$$

$$\text{Ext}(x) = b \quad \square$$



We need to change the model:

1) Assume independent X_1, X_2 s.t.

$$H_{\infty}(X_1), H_{\infty}(X_2) \geq K.$$

2) Assume the extractor is seeded:

$$\text{Ext}(S, X)$$

$$S \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell} ; X \in \{0, 1\}^m$$

The seed is uniform, but PUBLIC.

DEF. Ext: $\{0,1\}^d \times \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l$
 is a (k, ϵ) -SEEDED EXTRACTOR of
 $\forall X \in \{0,1\}^m$ s.t. $H_\infty(X) \geq k$

$$(S, \text{Ext}(S, X)) \stackrel{\sim}{\sim}_\epsilon (S, U_\epsilon)$$

where U_ϵ is UNIFORM, $S \equiv U_0$ is UNIFORM



$\stackrel{\sim}{\sim}_\epsilon$: ϵ -CLOSE TO UNIFORM

$$SD(X; Y) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_z |Pr \tilde{X} = z - Pr Y = z|$$

Equivalent: An UNBOUNDED ADV can't
distinguish a sample $z \leftarrow X$ from $z \leftarrow Y$
w.p. better than ϵ .

$$- \Pr[\gamma = z] \leq \epsilon$$